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During 2016 in Guangzhou, China, we detected infec-
tious avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in 39.8% of samples 
from chicken carcasses slaughtered at live poultry mar-
kets but none from carcasses supplied to supermarkets 
by facilities bypassing live poultry markets. Promoting 
supply chains with high biosecurity may reduce the risk 
for zoonotic AIV transmission.
Live poultry markets (LPMs) are hot spots for avian in-fluenza virus (AIV) amplification among poultry and 
dissemination to humans (1). Direct contact with live poul-
try is a major route of zoonotic transmission (2), but field 
data are limited on risks from contaminated poultry car-
casses (3). Control measures, including market rest-days 
and ban of live poultry stalls in urban areas with central 
slaughtering and sales of poultry carcasses, have been im-
plemented in China (3,4). In the city of Guangzhou (popu-
lation 14 million), 200,000 live poultry (5) and ≈81,000 
freshly processed poultry carcasses are supplied daily. Live 
poultry is supplied from 6 wholesale LPMs to ≈600 retail 
LPMs (5). Poultry carcasses are supplied through 2 sourc-
es: 1) poultry sourced from multiple independent poultry 
farms and slaughtered at the wholesale LPMs or 2) pri-
vate poultry slaughtering industries with integrated supply 
chains that bypass the LPM system (6).
Low pathogenic AIV replicates in the respiratory and 
gastrointestinal epithelium cells of infected birds; highly 
pathogenic AIV can replicate systematically in multiple 
tissues (7). In avian species, the lungs where AIV can rep-
licate are entrenched into the ribs and cannot be removed 
during poultry slaughtering; furthermore, AIV has been 
detected in air sacs from experimentally inoculated chick-
ens (8). The mass slaughtering process also provides an 
opportunity for cross-contamination through common use 
of tools or water. Previous studies have reported detection 
of infectious highly pathogenic AIV (H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, 
and H7N1) and low pathogenic AIV (H9N2) subtypes from 
poultry meat after natural infections or after experimental 
inoculations (8–14). However, how frequently infectious 
AIV can be detected from processed poultry carcasses is 
unclear. We report the detection of viral RNA and infec-
tious AIV from freshly processed chicken carcasses sold at 
different markets in Guangzhou, China.
The Study
During June–November 2016, we sampled fresh chicken 
carcasses supplied from the LPM system. Samples were 
collected twice each month from dressed poultry stalls 
within 1 wholesale LPM and from 3 retail LPMs located in 
different districts in Guangzhou. Dressed poultry or poultry 
carcasses are prepared similarly as in other countries (e.g., 
defeathered and eviscerated); however, the head and feet re-
main with the carcass. A total of 1,230 swabs were collected 
from the oropharynx, cloacal cavity, and visceral cavity of 
chicken carcasses supplied from the LPM system (Table 1).
During July–December 2016, we also sampled chilled 
chicken carcasses supplied from the private poultry slaugh-
tering industries that bypass the LPM system. Chicken car-
casses were sampled from 3 different supermarket chains 
once each month; 147 swabs were collected in virus trans-
port media (Table 1). The quantity of AIV viral RNA seg-
ment 7 (matrix gene) was determined by quantitative real-
time reverse transcription PCR (qRT-PCR) (15) and the 
infectious virus dose was determined by titration in MDCK 
cells, which are not as sensitive for AIV as the embryonated 
chicken eggs and might underestimate the rate of positivity. 
Influenza A virus matrix gene–positive samples were sub-
typed using H5-, H7-, or H9-specific primers and probes 
by qRT-PCR (15); the design of the primers and probes 
cannot differentiate whether the multiple basic amino acids 
are present at the hemagglutinin cleavage site.
The AIV-positive rates detected from fresh chicken 
carcasses varied by market type (Table 1). Rates of positive 
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viral RNA detected from oropharyngeal, cloacal, or visceral 
cavity samples of chicken carcasses sold at the retail mar-
kets were 20% higher than were those collected from the 
dressed poultry stalls (all p<0.1 by Fisher exact test) and 
>50% higher than those collected from the supermarkets 
(all p<0.002 by Fisher exact test) (Table 1). Samples col-
lected from retail markets had 9%–20% higher culture-pos-
itive rates than those collected from dressed poultry stalls 
(all p<0.2 by Fisher exact test); no culture-positive samples 
were identified from the supermarkets. qRT-PCR yielded 
higher rates of positivity than did the cell culture–based as-
say (all p<0.05 by Fisher exact test), possibly because of 
the inactivation of AIV during the scalding process, when 
the poultry carcasses are immersed in hot water (50°–64°C) 
for 45–120 s to loosen the feathers.
We detected significantly higher viral loads in oro-
pharyngeal swabs than in cloacal or visceral cavity swabs 
of chicken carcasses sold at the dressed poultry stalls or 
the retail markets (Figure). Most AIVs detected belonged 
to H9 subtype, which is consistent with our previous re-
port (15). We found samples positive for H7 or for H7 and 
H9 subtypes at a frequency of up to 6.3% (oropharyngeal 
swabs at the retail markets) (Table 2). We detected more 
diverse hemagglutinin subtypes from the chicken carcasses 
sold at the retail market than sold elsewhere; specifically, 
we detected H5 subtype only at retail market B.
Conclusions
Our results agree with results from a previous study that 
reported detection of AIV RNA from chicken carcasses 
sold at retail and dressed poultry stalls in Guangzhou (3). 
However, the previous study did not provide data on vi-
rus viability. Our data demonstrate high levels (39.8% of 
1,230 samples collected from carcasses) of contaminated 
chicken carcasses with infectious AIV supplied through 
the LPM system, either at the retail LPM or at the dressed 
poultry stalls. These results suggest potential infection risk 
for consumers through handling the poultry meat, contami-
nating other foods in the kitchen, or eating partially cooked 
poultry products. In contrast, we found no infectious AIV 
in the 147 chicken carcasses collected from supermarkets 
supplied through the integrated poultry production and 
slaughtering industries that bypass the LPM system. Chill-
ing should not affect the sensitivity of qRT-PCR and might 
help sustain survival of infectious virus. Although we did 
not assess the potential difference in the slaughtering pro-
cess at the private slaughtering industry and at LPMs, we 
believe qRT-PCR might still be sensitive enough to de-
tect AIV-contaminated carcasses after extensive cleaning. 
Collectively, our results suggest that AIV amplification 
through poultry mixing and extended overnight stay within 
the wholesale or retail LPM system (1) might have contrib-
uted to contamination of carcasses.
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Table 1. AIV detected from chicken carcasses sold at live poultry markets, dressed poultry stalls, or supermarkets, Guangzhou, 
Guangdong Province, China, June–December 2016* 
Swab type 
No. qRT-PCR positive/no. tested (%) 
 
No. culture positive/no. tested (%)† 
Dressed 
poultry stall‡ Retail market§ Supermarket¶ 
p 
value# 
Dressed 
poultry stall‡ Retail market§ Supermarket¶ 
p 
value# 
Oropharyngeal 67/121 (55.4) 207/277 (74.7) 2/62 (3.2) 0.097  44/121 36.4) 158/277 (57.0) 0/62 (0) 0.026 
Cloacal 55/120 (45.8) 177/265 (66.8) 4/62 (6.5) 0.053  38/120 31.7) 133/265 (50.2) 0/62 (0) 0.033 
Visceral cavity 48/118 (40.7) 203/329 (61.7) 2/23 (8.7) 0.033  23/118 19.5) 93/329 (28.3) 0/23 (0) 0.151 
*AIV, avian influenza virus; qRT-PCR, quantitative real-time reverse transcription PCR. 
†All qRT-PCR–positive samples were tested for infectivity in MDCK cells, and all qRT-PCR–negative samples were assumed negative for AIV infectivity. 
‡Chickens centrally slaughtered at the wholesale market are sold at designated dressed poultry stalls without live poultry on site. 
§Data from 3 retail markets located at different districts in Guangzhou city. 
¶Data from 3 supermarket chains with poultry supplied by different industrial suppliers. 
#Comparison of AIV-positive rates between dressed poultry stalls and retail markets by Fisher exact test. 
 
 
Table 2. AIV subtypes detected by qRT-PCR from swabs of chicken carcasses sold at live poultry markets and from chilled poultry 
supplied through slaughtering industries, Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, China, June–December 2016* 
Subtype 
Wholesale market 
 
Retail markets 
 
Supermarket 
OP Cloacal 
Visceral 
cavity OP Cloacal 
Visceral 
cavity OP Cloacal 
Visceral 
cavity 
H9 58/67 
(86.6) 
39/55 
(70.9) 
32/48 
(66.7) 
 166/207 
(80.2) 
143/177 
(80.8) 
131/203 
(64.5) 
 0/2 1/4 
(25.0) 
0/2 
H5 0/67 0/55 0/48  2/207 (1.0) 1/177 (0.6) 4/203 (2.0)  0/2 0/4 0/2 
H7 0/67 0/55 2/48 (4.2)  0/207 0/177 2/203 (1.0)  0/2 0/4 0/2 
H5+H9 0/67 0/55 0/48  4/207 (1.9) 6/177 (3.4) 5/203 (2.5)  0/2 0/4 0/2 
H7+H9 2/67 (3.0) 3/55 (5.5) 2/48 (4.2)  13/207 (6.3) 6/177 (3.4) 10/203 (5.0)  0/2 0/4 0/2 
H5+H7+H9 0/67 0/55 0/48  3/207 (1.5) 5/177 (2.8) 7/203 (3.5)  0/2 0/4 0/2 
Non-H5/H7/H9 4/67 (6.0) 3/55 (5.5) 1/48 (2.1)  10/207 (4.8) 7/177 (4.0) 27/203 
(13.3) 
 0/2 1/4 
(25.0) 
1/2 
(50.0) 
Low copy 
(nontypeable)† 
3/67 (4.5) 10/55 
(18.2) 
11/48 
(22.9) 
 9/207 (4.4) 9/177 (5.1) 17/203 (8.4)  2/2 
(100.0) 
2/4 
(50.0) 
1/2 
(50.0) 
*Values are no. positive/no. tested (%). AIV, avian influenza virus; OP, oropharyngeal; qRT-PCR, quantitative real-time reverse transcription PCR. 
†Samples with matrix gene copy below linear range of quantification (2.903 log10 matrix gene copies/mL) and are negative for H5/H7/H9 by qRT-PCR. 
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Figure. Copies of avian influenza virus RNA 
(A) and infectious viral loads (B) detected from 
chicken carcasses sold at live poultry markets 
or supplied through slaughtering industries, 
Guangzhou, Guangdong, China, June–December 
2016. The median value with interquartile range 
is shown for each dataset. Dotted lines represent 
the limit of linear range of quantification for viral 
RNA (2.903 log10 matrix gene copies/mL) (A) or the 
detection limit by TCID50 assay (1.789 log10 TCID50/
mL) in MDCK cells (B). p values from Kruskal-
Wallis test followed by Dunn’s multiple comparison 
test are shown. AIV, avian influenza virus; TCID50, 
50% tissue culture infectious dose.
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In a separate study conducted during June–Novem-
ber 2016, we detected similar rates of positive viral RNA 
from the oropharyngeal swabs (172 [47.8%] of 360) (p = 
0.172 by Fisher exact test) from live poultry sold at the 
same wholesale market as that detected from the chicken 
carcasses at the dressed poultry stalls (67 [55.4%] of 121) 
(Table 1). The result further supports that the AIV preva-
lence in the source poultry determines the level of residual 
AIV found on chicken carcasses.
In conclusion, our data suggest that chicken carcasses 
may pose a substantial zoonotic risk for AIV infection even 
in the absence of direct contact with live poultry. Central 
slaughtering might not by itself eliminate zoonotic risk if 
the source poultry have high rates of virus carriage. The 
LPM system in China continues to provide venues and op-
portunities of poultry mixing from different sources that fa-
cilitate AIV persistence and amplification despite interven-
tions, such as market rest-days and banning the holding of 
live poultry overnight, that aim to reduce such a risk (1). In 
this regard, promoting vertically integrated supply chains 
of farms and slaughterhouses with high biosecurity would 
be a promising effective control measure to reduce the risk 
for zoonotic transmission of AIV.
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